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Using the index proposed by Weymark (1995) for small open economies, 
the paper computes exchange market pressure and intervention indexes for 
Chile in the period from 1990 to 1998. This statistics can be used to assess 
timing and scale of currency crises, as they include exchange rate and 
reserves variations in one single indicator. The index is suited for 
intermediate exchange rate policies, since it gives due consideration to the 
possibility of accommodating exchange market pressures through changes 
in domestic credit. The monetarist model developed suggests low 
effectiveness of controls in affecting the exchange rate level, when the 
interest rate-elasticity of money demand is low. Substantial appreciative 
pressure on the Chilean peso is found over the period, with exception of 
isolated quarters following the introduction of the reserve requirement and 
following the outset of the Asian crisis.  
                                                           
* Banco Central do Brasil. Currently at the Stockholm Doctoral Program in Economics.  5 
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(Preliminar version, comments are welcome.) 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed but adjustable exchange 
rates, monetary authorities of various nations opted for managed floating rate systems, 
using international reserves or exchange rate variations to accommodate exchange 
market pressures.  Several Latin American countries chose to adopt exchange rate bands 
within which their currencies were allowed to fluctuate. Such was the case of Chile, 
which introduced an exchange rate band in 1984. The band was gradually enlarged and 
altered to account for changes in trading partners and productivity differentials. This 
process continued until September 1999, when the Central Bank decided to let the 
currency float freely, though the reference level used to set the center of the band is still 
published. 
 
In a world in which managed floating and quasi-fixed exchange rate regimes 
predominate, several indexes were proposed to measure the degree of monetary 
authority intervention in the exchange rate market. Historically, exchange market 
pressure indexes were defined to address the question of monetary policy independence 
(the debate on the insulation of the domestic economy from external shocks provided by 
floating exchange rate regimes). These indexes produce cardinal measurements of the 
magnitude of the pressures to which a currency is submitted and can be helpful in 
understanding the causes of external imbalances.   
 
A seminal paper on this subject was authored by Girton & Roper (1977) proposing an 
index to estimate the proportion of exchange rate pressures mitigated by exchange 
                                                           
() I am indebted to João Ricardo Faria, Fábia Carvalho and to an anonymous referee for their 
highly valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Any remaining deficiencies are my 
sole responsibility. 
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market interventions. However, they did not consider the possibility of accomodating 
these pressures through changes in domestic credits. Frenkel & Aizenman (1982) and, 
more recently, Weymark (1995) designed indexes capable of shedding some light upon 




Following the monetary approach to the balance of payments, Weymark (1995) 
develops a model-dependent exchange market pressure (EMP) index, used as the 
denominator of an intervention index - defined as the proportion of exchange market 
pressure absorbed by monetary authority intervention. The rationale underlying the 
monetary approach to the balance of payments is that net excess supply of goods and 
securities by residents (expressed in the current and capital accounts) will be reflected in 
a net excess demand for money. Thus, expectations and asset substitution are aspects 
considered critical in determining the point of equilibrium. The exchange rate is thus 
regarded as a price that clears the supply and the demand for monies and other financial 
assets. It should be mentioned that one important flaw in this type of model is that it 
does not incorporate intertemporal governmental or individual budget constraints. 
 
Following Weymark’s methodology, this paper computes the exchange market 
intervention index for the Chilean economy in the 90s,  incorporating the Chilean 
reserve requirement on capital inflows. The next section provides a short description of 
this reserve requirement on capital inflows. Section III briefly presents the analytical 
model, while estimation procedures are described in Section IV.  
2.  Reserve Requirements on Capital Inflows: the Chilean Experience 
 
In the early 90s, Chile and many other Latin American countries had to cope with a 
surge in capital inflows capable of generating outcomes that conflicted sharply with 
Central Bank objectives: high growth in monetary aggregates and real appreciation of 
the currency. A relatively lax US monetary policy coupled with a stringent monetary 
policy in Chile produced capital inflows equivalent to more than 10% of GDP. About 
                                                           
1 Frenkel & Aizenman (1982) showed that the desirability of exchange rate flexibility is directly 
proportional to the variance of monetary shocks (money demand and supply, foreign prices and 
deviations from purchasing power parity), to the propensity to save out of transitory income and 
inversely proportional to the share of non-tradable goods in the economy.  8 
half this volume corresponded to short-term credits. Monetary authorities responded by 
imposing a one-year non-interest-bearing reserve requirement on selective inflows. 
Initially (June 1991), the reserve requirement was set at 20% of inflows, increasing to 
30% in May 1992. This reserve requirement was gradually widened to cover virtually 
all non-FDI and non-trade credit flows, closing the loopholes in what was described by 
one Central Bank official as a “cat-and-mouse game” between market participants and 
monetary authorities. The effectiveness of reserve requirements in avoiding apreciation 
is not yet a settled issue. However, studies as Montiel & Reinhart (1999) suggest that 
they did change the composition of capital inflows. One reason to the failure to avoid 
appreciation could be that reduction of yields due to implicit taxes are perceived as 
minor when compared to the expectations of currency appreciation. 
 
If, on the one hand, the reserve requirement was aimed at avoiding appreciation of the 
currency resulting from rigidities in the prices of non-tradable goods and labor, on the 
other it represented an additional cost. In practical terms, this reserve requirement 
functioned as an implicit tax on foreign capital, so that commercial banks incorporated 
the cost of this non-interest-bearing deposit into their lending rate, charging their clients 
more for their US$ issuances. This means that the condition of uncovered interest parity 
in Chile must be adapted so that reserve requirements will not alter the interest rate i, 
earned by foreign investors, assuming that the cost of the reserve requirement is borne 
by locals (see equation 3 of Section III). 
 
In the wake of the drop in capital flows to emerging markets that followed the Asian 
crisis, BCCh reduced its reserve requirement to 10% in June 1998, eliminating it 
completely three months later.  
 
Chile has sterilized foreign inflows since 1990, when real interest increased to 9.7%. It 
is arguable that sterilization may prolong the interest rate differential  and thus postpone 
achievement of equilibrium. However, if capital inflows are not reined in, the result will 
be deterioration of the Central Bank balance sheet, since that institution accumulates 
liabilities for which it has to pay higher yields than it is able to earn under normal 
conditions on its foreign assets (at least, this is clearly the case in most Latin American 
economies). 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  Modifiquei o 
tempo do verbo por causa da 
palavra “since” que dá o sentido de 
1990 até agora. É isso mesmo que 
quer dizer?  9 
3.  The Small Open Economy Model 
 
This section briefly summarizes Section II of Weymark (1995), incorporating into the 
UIP equation the additional cost of external financing generated by the reserve 
requirement on inflows. 
 
Exchange market pressure is defined for a small open economy model (assumed to be 
the case of Chile in the period under study). Equation (1) is the money demand 
expression in the log-linear form, with exogenous output, where clearing of the money 
market is assumed (see notations at the end of this paper).  
 




We assume that financial assets are perfect substitutes. The existence of a reserve 
requirement εt for each unit of capital inflow increases the cost of external financing, so 
that the uncovered interest parity condition is changed to incorporate this additional 
cost. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that all deposits have the same maturity 
as the reserve requirement period. This means that the external financing cost is 
increased from i* to i*/(1-εt). Thus, the difference { (εt.i*)/(1-εt) } is the cost of the 
reserve requirement.   
 
 
                                                           
2 One could classify goods into tradables and non-tradables so that only the price of tradable 
goods would be directly affected by the exchange rate. Since this separation is somewhat 
arbitrary we have used the simpler model. 
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Equation (4) states that changes in the money supply can occur due to changes in 
domestic credits or changes in the level of international reserves while equation (5) 
expresses the response function to changes in the exchange rate. 
 
 
ρt is a policy choice that determines the extent to which exchange market pressure is 
absorbed by monetary authority interventions. In a free floating exchange rate regime, 
ρt would be zero, so that there is no smoothing of the exchange rate level et at all, while 
in a fixed regime ρt would be infinite. 
Substituting (2) and (3) in (1) and taking the first differences we have 
 
 
Now, substituting (4) and (5) in (6), and assuming that the money market clears yields 
 
 
It can be shown that this equation applies to sterilized as well as unsterilized 
interventions. Note that this expression implies that the lower the interest rate elasticity 
of money demand, the lower will be the effectiveness of interest rate differentials (and 
thus reserve requirements on capital inflows) in impacting the exchange rate level. 
 
The terms inside the brackets represent the excess demand for currency that originates 
exchange market pressure. EMP is defined as the exchange rate that would prevail after 
elimination of excess demand in the absence of exchange market intervention. To 
measure EMP in Section III, we set ρt at zero, while expectations are formed based on 
the actual exchange rate policy. 
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  “braces” ou 
“brackets”? 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  Acho que 
“generates” seria melhor.  11
 
What equation (7) states is that excess demand for money could be generated by 
external (prices or international interest rates), domestic (income, money velocity or 
changes in reserve requirements on capital inflows) or expectational shocks.  
 
When the government intervenes directly in the exchange rate market by buying or 
selling foreign exchange, the general formula for exchange market pressure in period t 
is given by:  
 
 
While the first term on the right side measures actual exchange rate variation, the 
second term captures the share of exchange rate variation absorbed by direct monetary 
authority intervention.  
 
Girton & Roper’s index represents the specific case in which the denominator of the 
second term equals unity. The estimation of elasticities of equations (1) and (2) is 
needed to transform changes in reserves in exchange rate equivalent units. 
 
4.  Data and Estimation – Chile in the 90es 
 
To compute the elasticities of equations (1) and (2), two-stage least squares were used, 
as explanatory variables and residuals may be contemporary correlated. All variables 
were taken in logs, using monthly data. Since unit roots tests could not reject the 
hypothesis of the existence of a unit root, except for the nominal interest rates, we took 
the first differences of the series for the estimation. Nominal interest rates were taken in 
levels. Lagged variables were used as instruments, except for output, which is 
exogenous to M2. 
 




e EMP t t (8)  12
M2 figures were obtained from BCCh. The same applies to the real interest rate (the real 
rate for 90 day PRBCs)
3. Nominal interest rates were calculated with the ex post 
variation of the Unidad de Fomento published by BCCh. The twelve-month moving 
average of the IMACEC economic activity index was employed as the activity level 
indicator. This index encompasses practically the entire Chilean GDP. The three-month 
US Dollar Libor was used as the external interest rate. 
 
Price indexes, average exchange rates, as well as domestic credits and foreign reserve 
data were obtained from IMF’s IFS CD-ROM. Changes in domestic credits and foreign 
reserves were computed accounting for changes in the money multiplier (see notes in 
appendix). The index of external inflation – for equation (2) - was constructed by 
weighting the consumer price variations of the US (45%), Germany (30%) and Japan 
(25%) (The weights were those used by the Central Bank to set the center-point of the 
exchange rate band).  
 
Estimation of equation (1) led to the following results, after correction for an MA(2,4) 
error process (t-values in parentheses): 
   (4.0691)           (7.8021)  (2.4673)     
R
2=0.0715  F=6.3495  DW=1.8140  Q(30)=28.55   
 
First differences of the residuals were taken as a proxy for money velocity shocks. The 
very low positive interest rate elasticity may be somewhat surprising but can be 
explained by the positive impact of interest rates on indexed deposits, as we are using 
M2.  
 
                                                           
3 Between 1985 and May 1995, Banco Central de Chile’s main monetary policy instrument was 
the real interest rate of 90 day PRBCs that is calculated on the basis of the change of the UF - 
Unidad de Fomento, an account unit that is adjusted according to inflation in  the previous 
month. This choice is attributed mainly to the observed volatility of money demand and the high 
degree of indexation in the Chilean economy. Over the medium-term, this rate equals ex post 
the real interest rate. As of May 1995, the Central Bank started using the interbank overnight 
lending rate as its intermediate target (tasa reajustable interbancaria). 
 
t t t t i y p m ⋅ + ∆ ⋅ + ∆ ⋅ = ∆ 000613 . 0 6514 . 1 7213 . 0 2
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿  Não é “movable 
average”?  13
For equation (2), an MA(1) error process was found significant. 
        (3.1943)   (5.3918)    (2.0581) 
R
2=0.4199  F=20.7149  DW=1.9128  Q(30)=32.35   
 
With  elasticities on hand, exchange market pressure was estimated according to 
equations (7) and (8). Table I shows the quarterly evolution of the EMP index, 
comparing it with Girton & Roper’s index. Negative values for the EMP index indicate 
net appreciation pressure, while positive values mean that the currency is under 
depreciative pressure. The table shows that, despite imposition of reserve requirements 
on capital inflows, the Chilean peso was submitted to continued appreciative pressure 
during the 90s, except for 1991:II (when the reserve requirement was introduced), 
1992:I and the period following the Asian crisis. 
  
The table also shows the index of intervention activity, obtained according to the 
formula 
 
The intervention activity index measures the share of exchange market pressure 
absorbed by direct Central Bank intervention. 
  
From this definition, it follows that the intervention index, wt , would be zero in a free 
float and one in a fixed exchange rate regime. An average of 0.196 was found between 
1990 and 1998. The intervention index was in the [0,1] range in 28 out of 35 quarters, 
suggesting that monetary authorities acted to smooth the path of the exchange rate 
during most part of the decade.
4 Despite the volatility of the index, a downward trend 
                                                           
4 Negative values of wt indicate that monetary authorities actively depreciated the currency, 
while values above one indicate that strong resistance against depreciation led to appreciation 
(or that EMPt was in the vicinity of zero). 























was visible before the outset of the Asian crisis in 1997. The average between 1990 and 
1991 was 0.424 compared to 0.172 between 1992-1997. This may be due to the 










Table I – Exchange Market Pressure and Intervention Activity 
  Exchange Market Pressure  Intervention    Exchange Market Pressure  Intervention 
  Weymark Girton&Roper  ωt 
  Weymark Girton&Roper  ωt 
     1994:III  -0.378  -0.330  0.167 
1990:II  -0.152 -0.090 0.544  1994:IV  -0.827 -0.524 0.485 
1990:III  -0.570 -0.407 0.378  1995:I  -0.562 -0.417 0.341 
1990:IV  -0.776 -0.489 0.490  1995:II  -0.346 -0.348 -0.006 
1991:I  -0.952 -0.631 0.446  1995:III  -0.357 -0.471 -0.423 
1991:II  0.334 0.170 0.649 1995:IV  -0.700  -0.622  0.146 
1991:III  -1.013 -0.925 0.116  1996:I  -0.513 -0.535 -0.056 
1991:IV  -0.773 -0.572 0.344  1996:II  -0.391 -0.355 0.122 
1992:I  0.411 0.250 0.518 1996:III  -0.245  -0.211  0.186 
1992:II  -1.297 -0.962 0.342  1996:IV  -0.623 -0.554 0.147 
1992:III  -1.484 -1.151 0.297  1997:I  -0.465 -0.331 0.380 
1992:IV  -0.713 -0.659 0.100  1997:II  -0.433 -0.322 0.340 
1993:I  -1.218 -0.958 0.283  1997:III  -0.376 -0.355 0.074 
1993:II  -0.600 -0.488 0.246  1997:IV  -0.491 -0.488 0.007 
1993:III  -0.287 -0.315 -0.128 1998:I  0.024  -0.018 2.337 
1993:IV  -0.535 -0.544 -0.022 1998:II  -0.054 -0.188 -3.282 
1994:I  -0.870  -0.624  0.374 1998:III  0.227 0.154 0.426 
1994:II  -0.227 -0.189 0.221  1998:IV  -0.221 -0.176 0.265 
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Figure I - Real Effective Exchange Rate 





















The monetarist model developed suggests little room for interest rates disincentives in 
affecting exchange rate levels, when the interest rate elasticity of money demand is low 
(β2), as relative supply of money has rather low sensitiveness to interest rates. This 
might be the case in a highly indexed economy where wealth effects of interest rate 
hikes are sizeable. The results comes in line with findings of Montiel & Reinhart 
(1999), that reserve requirements on inflows do not diminished capital inflows, in spite 
of changing it’s composition. 
 
In spite of the well-known difficulties in explaining exchange rate movements on the 
basis of fundamentals (especially in the short-run), Weymark’s exchange market 
pressure index provides a cardinal measurement of the pressures to which a currency is 
submitted, allowing for a better understanding of the driving forces underlying excess 
money demand or supply.  
 
Between 1990 and 1998, exchange market pressure in Chile was negative except for 
four quarters (91:II, 92:I, 98:I and 98:III), indicating substantial appreciative pressure on 
the Chilean peso during the period. The monetary authority intervention activity index 
shows that the Central Bank acted to smooth the path of the exchange rate in 28 out of 
35 quarters studied. Evidence also  points to a declining intervention activity level until 
1997. 
 
Future research might do well to analyze the results of lesser rigidity in the assumptions 




εt – reserve requirement on capital inflows 
∆dt = (ht.Dt- ht-1.Dt-1)/Bt-1  where ht is the money multiplier, Dt is the stock of domestic credit in 
billions of Chilean pesos (obtained from IMF’s IFS statistics) and Bt-1 is the monetary base 
composed of domestic credits and foreign reserves 
∆rt = (ht.Rt.Et- ht-1.Rt-1.Et-1)/Bt-1 where Rt is the stock of foreign reserves in billions of US 
dollars (IFS) and Et is the exchange rate expressed in Chilean pesos per US dollar. 
et – log of nominal exchange rate in Chilean pesos per US dollar (period average) 
E[et+1|Ωt] – expectation of the nominal exchange rate level at t+1 in period t with the information 
set available at t 
it – log of nominal domestic interest rates 
it* – log of world interest rates (3 month US dollar LIBOR) 
mt – log of money stock (M2) in billion of Chilean pesos 
pt – log of the consumer price index published by IFS 
pt* - log of the price index of relevant external inflation (weighted average of consumer price 
variations in US (0.45), Germany (0.30) and Japan (0.25)) 
rer – real exchange rate (IFS) 
vt – log of money velocity shocks 
yt – log of IMACEC index (monthly indicator of economic activity level) 
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